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NEVADA’S CLEAN INDOOR AIR ACT –




The anti-smoking movement has reached Nevada in the form of the
Nevada Clean Indoor Air Act (“NCIAA” or “Act”).1  In 2005, Nevada voters
placed an initiative on the ballot to outlaw smoking in certain public places for
the stated purpose of “[p]rotecting children and families from secondhand
smoke in most public places, excluding stand-alone bars and gaming areas of
casinos.”2  Known as the NCIAA, the initiative contained both criminal sanc-
tions and civil penalties for noncompliance.3
Since the Act’s passage in the November 2006 general election, business
owners have resisted compliance and challenged the new law.  For example, in
December 2006, a group of tavern owners requested an injunction against the
Nevada Attorney General, Clark County District Attorney, and numerous law
enforcement agencies to preclude enforcement of the Act on constitutional
grounds.4  As a result, in February 2007, Judge Douglas Herndon of the Eighth
Judicial District Court of Clark County declared the criminal component of the
NCIAA unconstitutionally vague, but upheld the civil provisions of the Act.5
The tavern owners continue to challenge the remaining provisions of the
NCIAA as a civil statute in their appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, further
discussed in section III of this Note.6  The defendants also appealed the district
court’s injunction against the criminal component of the Act.7  Some of the
specific constitutional challenges to the NCIAA as a civil statute are claims that
it violates the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Nevada
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2009.  Special thanks to Tom
Welch, whose idea inspired this Note.
1 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483 (2007).
2 ASSEM. 2005-I.P. 1, 73d Sess., § 1 (Nev. 2005).
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483.
4 See Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Fame Operating Co., Inc. v.
Chanos, No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Tavern Owners’
Complaint].
5 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part, Denying Summary Judgment in Part, Fame
Operating Co., No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2007).
6 Notice of Appeal, Fame Operating Co., No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13,
2007) [hereinafter Notice of Appeal I]; Notice of Appeal, Fame Operating Co., No. 06-
A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Notice of Appeal II].
7 Defendant Chanos’ Notice of Appeal, Fame Operating Co., No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th
Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Notice of Appeal III].
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Constitutions by relying on unfair distinctions between casinos, distinctions not
reasonably related to accomplishing the purpose of the Act.8  Using this argu-
ment, opponents to the NCIAA contend that the Act discriminates among simi-
larly situated businesses by its definition of casinos, which are exempt from the
Act’s provisions.9  Furthermore, opponents of the NCIAA argue that the Act
violates the due process clauses of both the United States and Nevada Constitu-
tions because its language is too vague to provide adequate notice of what
actions the NCIAA prohibits.10
This Note will discuss the casino exemption and other constitutional chal-
lenges to the NCIAA, concluding that the Nevada Supreme Court should
uphold the constitutionality of the civil components of the Act against the pend-
ing due process challenge for vagueness, and grant the constitutional challenge
against civil enforcement of the Act on equal protection grounds.  Section II
gives a history of tobacco legislation and the NCIAA, including some compari-
sons between the NCIAA and similar legislation in other states.  Section III
provides an overview of pending litigation, focusing on several cases challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the NCIAA.  Section IV offers two parts analyzing
the NCIAA and its implications.  The first part analyzes two main cases in
depth.  The second part discusses enforcement and the steps by business own-
ers to allow smoking in their establishments while complying with the Act, and
also offers some less invasive ways to encourage tavern owners to go smoke-
free.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Tobacco use has been a part of American culture since colonial times.
However, it was not until the mid-1900s that people became aware of the health
hazards associated with smoking tobacco.11  In the 1990s, the focus on the
health hazards associated with smoking broadened to include the hazard to
others caused by secondhand smoke.12  This section will give an overview of
the country’s history of tobacco use and the resulting legislation, followed by a
discussion of the origins of the NCIAA and a brief comparison to other states’
clean indoor air acts.
8 See Tavern Owners’ Complaint, supra note 4, at 3, 7-8.
9 Id. at 7. See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(9)(a) (2007) (defining “casino” as “an
entity that contains a building or large room devoted to gambling games or wagering on a
variety of events.  A casino must possess a nonrestricted gaming license as described in
[Nevada Revised Statutes, section] 463.0177 [(2007)] and typically uses the word ‘casino’ as
part of its proper name”).
10 See Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
11-12, Fame Operating Co., No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2006); Defen-
dant, Bent Barrel, Inc. d.b.a. Bilbo’s Bar & Grill Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Prelim-
inary Injunction, Sands v. Bent Barrel, Inc., No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. May 7,
2007) [hereinafter Bilbo’s Opposition].
11 MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE:  FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN TOBACCO
POLITICS 9 (2d ed. 2005).
12 Peter D. Jacobson & Lisa M. Zapawa, Clean Indoor Air Restrictions:  Progress and
Promise, in REGULATING TOBACCO 207, 208-11 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman
eds., 2001).
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A. America’s History of Tobacco Use
Tobacco use in the United States dates back to before the arrival of the
first Europeans in North America, as documented by Christopher Columbus.13
He wrote in his journal during his voyages in the 1400s that the Indians of the
New World were smoking tobacco and using snuff.14  At the original James-
town settlement in later colonial times, John Rolfe became the first European
American to grow tobacco for commercial purposes.15  During these early
days, people mainly used tobacco either as snuff or in pipes, with cigarettes not
becoming popular in the United States until after the Civil War.16
Moving forward in history to World War II, cigarettes became such an
integral part of everyday life that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt desig-
nated tobacco as a protected crop, and American servicemen received cigarettes
in their survival rations.17  By the end of World War II, cigarette sales were at
an all-time high, and a tobacco shortage developed.18  Since then, Hollywood
has encouraged Americans to smoke.  For example, the movies A Street Car
Named Desire and West Side Story glamorized smoking in the 1950s.19
The country’s attitude toward smoking began to change, however, during
the 1950s after Reader’s Digest published research results linking smoking
with lung cancer.20  Initially, cigarette sales declined, but later rebounded when
cigarette companies developed and advertised filtered cigarettes and low-tar
formulas to make smoking “healthier.”21
B. The Evolution of Anti-Smoking Legislation
Government regulation of both the production and consumption of
tobacco has been in place since John Rolfe’s early days of raising tobacco in
13 Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline, http://www.tobacco.org/History/Tobacco_History.html
(last visited June 19, 2009).
14 Id.  ‘Snuff’ is pulverized tobacco inhaled through the nose. See THE AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1648 (4th ed. 2006).
15 CNN.com, A Brief History of Tobacco , http://www.cnn.com/US/9705/tobacco/history/
index.html (last visited June 19, 2009).
16 Id.
17 Marot Williamson, Comment, When One Person’s Habit Becomes Everyone’s Problem:
The Battle Over Smoking Bans in Bars and Restaurants, 14 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161,
164 (2007) (citing JOHN C. BURNHAM, BAD HABITS:  DRINKING, SMOKING, TAKING DRUGS,
GAMBLING, SEXUAL MISBEHAVIOR, AND SWEARING IN AMERICAN HISTORY 101 (1993));
Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline:  The Twentieth Century, 1900-1949—The Rise of the Ciga-
rette, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/Tobacco_History20-1.html (last visited June
19, 2009).
18 Borio, supra note 17.
19 Lara Murphy, Hollywood Keeps Smoking Glamorous:  Actors Blamed for Influencing
Youth to Smoke, RANGER ONLINE, Sept. 9, 2004, http://media.www.theranger.org/media/
storage/paper1010/news/2004/09/09/News/Hollywood.Keeps.Smoking.Glamorous-1999386.
shtml.  Other, more recent examples of Hollywood movies portraying the glamour of smok-
ing include Dr. No., showing “Bond, James Bond” smoking cigarettes, and Chicago, show-
ing Catherine Zeta-Jones seductively smoking a cigarette on stage. See id.
20 DERTHICK, supra note 11, at 9. See also Gene Borio, Tobacco Timeline:  The Twentieth
Century, 1950-1999—The Battle is Joined, http://www.tobacco.org/resources/history/
Tobacco_History20-2.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); CNN.com, supra note 15.
21 DERTHICK, supra note 11, at 9-10; Borio, supra note 20; CNN.com, supra note 15.
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Virginia.22  For example, as early as 1604, King James I of England placed a
high tax on imported tobacco, and perceptively declared tobacco use “[a cus-
tom] loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain” and “dan-
gerous to the lungs.”23  However, the King relaxed this view in 1621 by
granting a monopoly to tobacco companies in Virginia and Bermuda to produce
tobacco to import into England.24
Regulation of the consumption of tobacco continued, and in  the early
twentieth century, forty-three out of forty-five states had anti-cigarette laws.25
Regulations later included warning the public of the hazards of smoking, and
beginning in the 1960s, the Surgeon General’s warning appeared on all ciga-
rette packs stating, “Caution:  Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health.”26  This labeling was the result of scientific evidence that suggested a
causal relationship between smoking and cancer.27  By 1965, Congress passed
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which required the Sur-
geon General’s warning to appear on every pack of cigarettes sold in
America.28  In 1971, the Marlboro Man, spokesman for Marlboro cigarettes,
disappeared from television after Congress banned all broadcast tobacco adver-
tising.29  By 1990, Congress banned smoking on all interstate buses and domes-
tic airline flights lasting two hours or less.30
One of the first lawsuits targeting big tobacco companies (collectively
referred to as “Big Tobacco”) began in 1983 when Rose Cipollone, a smoker
dying from lung cancer, and her husband sued Liggett Group in New Jersey,
alleging that the company failed to warn her about the dangers of its products.31
Her surviving spouse won a $400,000 judgment, which the appellate court later
overturned.32  In 1993, a group of smokers sought certification of a nationwide
class action against tobacco manufacturers on behalf of “all nicotine dependent
persons in the United States,” and their estates and relatives.33  The plaintiffs
claimed that cigarette manufacturers “failed to inform smokers that nicotine is
22 Nat’l Comm’n on Marihuana & Drug Abuse, History of Tobacco Regulation, http://
www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/LIBRARY/studies/nc/nc2b.htm [hereinafter History of
Tobacco Regulation] .
23 Id. See also Williamson, supra note 17, at 165 (quoting GEORGINA LOVELL, YOU ARE
THE TARGET:  BIG TOBACCO:  LIES, SCAMS – NOW THE TRUTH 13 (2002)).
24 History of Tobacco Regulation, supra note 22.
25 Borio, supra note 17.
26 DERTHICK, supra note 11, at 12.
27 Id. at 10.
28 Id. at 12.
29 Id. at 14.
30 Id. at 15.
31 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986). See also DERTHICK,
supra note 11, at 31-32 (discussing the Cipollone case generally); Robert L. Rabin, The
Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 12, at 176,
176-78.
32 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 546-547 (3d Cir. 1990).  Note this deci-
sion was reversed in part by the United States Supreme Court and remanded for a new trial.
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508-09, 525-27, 530-31 (1992). See
also Rabin, supra note 31, at 178.
33 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 548-49 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d, 84 F.3d
734 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Rabin, supra note 31, at 179-85 (discussing the case
generally).
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ307.txt unknown Seq: 5 15-SEP-09 10:18
Spring 2009] NEVADA’S CLEAN INDOOR AIR ACT 729
addictive,” denied the addictive nature of cigarettes, and manipulated nicotine
levels.34  Nationwide class certification was initially granted by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, but the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.35  This class action lawsuit began a wave of similar
state lawsuits and kicked off a new era of tobacco litigation.36
Other state class action lawsuits followed until 1998 when the country’s
major cigarette manufacturers entered into Tobacco Settlement Agreements
with forty-six states, five United States territories, and the District of Colum-
bia.37  The settlement agreements mandated changes in tobacco advertising and
marketing and imposed restrictions on cigarette sales.38  In addition, the settle-
ment agreements required tobacco companies to pay damages to the states in
the amount of ten billion dollars up front and two hundred billion dollars over a
period of twenty-five years, with ongoing annual payments to states “in
perpetuity.”39  Although the settlement agreements were purportedly for reim-
bursing the states for health care costs associated with smoking-induced ill-
nesses,40 whether state governments spent the settlement funds as intended is
questionable.41  Today, tobacco companies voluntarily advertise the health
risks associated with smoking and sponsor anti-smoking campaigns aimed
predominantly at discouraging youth from picking up the habit.42  For example,
Philip Morris goes so far as to offer seminars on its website to help smokers
quit.43
With smoking now heavily regulated in terms of warnings and advertising
to primary smokers, public health officials turned their focus to the ill effects
on others from secondhand smoke, especially children.44  By the 1990s, many
states regulated smoking, and many implemented some type of clean indoor air
act mandating no-smoking areas and/or smoke-free buildings and restaurants.45
34 Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 548.
35 See Castano, 84 F.3d at 752.
36 Rabin, supra note 31, at 184, 189.
37 Id. at 190-91. See also PHILIP MORRIS USA, MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 35
(2008), http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Responsibility/Government_Relations/
Legislative_Issues/pdfs/msa.pdf.aspx [hereinafter MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT].
38 DERTHICK, supra note 11, at 82-87; Rabin, supra note 31, at 190-91.
39 MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 37, at 35.
40 Rabin, supra note 31, at 191.
41 For example, in Nevada, a large portion of the proceeds from the tobacco settlements
went to fund the state’s Millennium Scholarship program, an attempt to boost lagging attend-
ance at state colleges and universities, rather than reimbursement of health care costs.  Mem-
orandum from Carol Stonefield, Senior Research Analyst, to Chairman Raymond D. Rawson
and Members of the Task Force for the Fund for a Healthy Nev. 3 (Oct. 8, 2003), availa-
ble at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/72nd/Interim/StatCom/HealthyNV/exhibits/10126B.pdf.
Although the appropriate spending of the tobacco settlement funds is an important topic, it is
beyond the scope of this Note.
42 Philip Morris USA, Helping Reduce Underage Tobacco Use, http://www.philipmorrisusa.
com/en/cms/Responsibility/Helping_Reduce_Underage_Tobacco_Use/default.aspx?src=
top_nav (last visited June 19, 2009).
43 Philip Morris USA, Quitting and Staying Quit, http://www2.philipmorriusa.com/en/
quitassist/quitting/index.asp?src=search (last visited June 19, 2009).
44 PETER D. JACOBSON & JEFFREY WASSERMAN, TOBACCO CONTROL LAWS:  IMPLEMENTA-
TION AND ENFORCEMENT 5-6 (1997).
45 Id. at 10-14.
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Although Big Tobacco is willing to concede that smoking should be prohibited
in some public places, tobacco companies and other conservative groups
impose rigorous questioning to anti-smoking legislation and speak out against
the complete bans contained in most state clean indoor air acts.46  As Philip
Morris points out, restaurant and bar owners are able to accommodate their
patrons’ needs and determine their own smoking policies.47  Philip Morris’
position on the matter is that “[t]he public can then choose whether or not to
frequent places where smoking is permitted.”48  The focus of this Note is the
NCIAA’s civil provisions that ban smoking in casinos and stand-alone bars in
an effort to protect patrons from secondhand smoke.
C. How Nevada’s Clean Indoor Air Act Compares to Other State Clean
Indoor Air Acts
The NCIAA began as a voter initiative in 2005 and became law following
the Nevada general election on November 7, 2006.49  The Act bans smoking in
most public places, with some exceptions.50  The NCIAA became effective on
December 8, 2006, and is codified in the Nevada Revised Statutes, chapter 202,
crimes against health and safety.51  The stated purpose of the Act is
“[p]rotecting children and families from secondhand smoke in most public
places, excluding stand-alone bars and gaming areas of casinos.”52  Challenges
to the initiative arose even before voters placed the measure on the ballot in
2006.53  Since enactment of the NCIAA, numerous bar, tavern, and casino
owners have challenged the constitutionality of the Act.54
Most states now have some type of clean indoor air act.55  Similar to other
states’ legislation banning smoking in public places, the NCIAA prohibits
smoking in schools, childcare facilities, theaters, malls, grocery stores, and res-
taurants.56  Many exemptions contained in the NCIAA are also present in other
states’ clean indoor air acts.  For example, private residences, hotel rooms, and
in some states, American Indian cultural activities, are exempt from smoking
restrictions.57  However, some states’ smoking legislation contains unique pro-
46 Jacobson & Zapawa, supra note 12, at 208.
47 Philip Morris USA, Public Place Smoking Restrictions, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/
en/cms/Responsibility/Government_Relations/Public_Place_Smoking_Restrictions/default.
aspx?src=search (last visited June 19, 2009).
48 Id.
49 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483 (2007); ASSEM. 2005-I.P. 1, 73d Sess. (Nev. 2005). See
also Nevada Secretary of State, 2006 Official Statewide General Election Results, Novem-
ber 7, 2006, http://sos.state.nv.us/elections/results/2006StateWideGeneral/ElectionSummary.
asp (last visited June 19, 2009).
50 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483.
51 Id.
52 ASSEM. 2005-I.P. 1, § 1.
53 See Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1226 (Nev. 2006).
54 See, e.g., Tavern Owners’ Complaint, supra note 4; Answer & Counterclaim, Sands v.
Bent Barrel, Inc., No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2007) [hereinafter Bilbo’s
Answer & Counterclaim].
55 See, e.g., Jacobson & Zapawa, supra note 12, at 215.
56 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483.
57 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-104 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-38-3, -3.5
(West 2007).
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visions.  For instance, New York expressly permits smoking in cigar bars
where ten percent or more of the bar’s income derives from on-site tobacco
sales, not including vending machines.58  Many of the other states’ clean indoor
air acts include the same definition of “bar” as set forth in the NCIAA:  “an
establishment devoted primarily to the sale of alcoholic beverages . . . in which
food service is incidental . . . .”59  However, some states’ smoking legislation
provides bars with only a temporary exemption, putting bar owners on notice
that at some particular future date, this exemption will expire, requiring the bar
to become smoke-free.60
Nevada’s Clean Indoor Air Act also contains some interesting provisions
not included in other states’ clean indoor air acts.  For instance, the NCIAA is
unique in two of its exemptions.  First, brothels are exempt from the Act.61
Second, the NCIAA’s impact varies depending upon the type of gaming license
an establishment holds.62  The NCIAA allows smoking in casinos that prohibit
the patronage of minors, and in stand-alone bars, strip clubs, retail tobacco
stores, and private residences.63  Although some states also exempt casinos
from their clean indoor air acts,64 these states do not define the term “casino”
with reference to what type of gaming license an establishment holds.  The
NCIAA’s definition of “casino” requires the casino to hold a nonrestricted (as
opposed to restricted) gaming license, pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes,
section 463.0177.65  Section 463.0177 allows an unrestricted gaming license
for establishments with sixteen or more slot machines and slot machine
routes.66  The effect of this distinction means establishments with sixteen or
more slot machines may allow smoking, while almost identical operations with
only fifteen slot machines may not.  This definition of “casino” is one of the
most controversial provisions of the NCIAA and is one reason the Act has
already faced several constitutional challenges.67
58 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (McKinney 2008).
59 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(9)(m). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-40-103 (defining
“bar” as “an establishment . . . devoted to serving alcoholic beverages . . . and in which the
serving of food is only incidental to the service of alcoholic beverages . . . .”); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 1399-n (defining “bar” as “any area . . . devoted to the sale and service of
alcoholic beverages . . . where the service of food is only incidental to the consumption of
such beverages”).
60 For example, California’s Indoor Clean Air Act exempted bars until January 1, 1998. See
CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(f)(1)(A) (West 2007).  The Utah Indoor Clean Air Act exempted
taverns until January 1, 2009 if the tavern was licensed on or before May 15, 2006, or
licensed before May 15, 2006, and changed ownership after May 15, 2006. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 26-38-3(2)(c).
61 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(3)(c).
62 Id. § 202.2483(3)(a), (9)(a).
63 Id. § 202.2483(3).
64 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(f)(1) (exempting “gaming clubs” from the provision
of its clean indoor air act).
65 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(9)(a).
66 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0177 (2007) (stating the criteria for a nonrestricted gaming
license).
67 See supra note 54.
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III. PRINCIPAL CASES
There is much litigation surrounding the NCIAA, with pivotal cases cur-
rently pending in both the state district court and the Nevada Supreme Court.68
This section will give a broad overview of those cases, beginning with the
initial challenge to placing the initiative on the ballot, followed by a number of
constitutional challenges to the language of the NCIAA and its exemptions for
a “stand alone bar” and “casino.”  Finally, this section will discuss several
cases filed by the Southern Nevada Health District to enforce the NCIAA, and
the various ways in which these cases were resolved.
A. Challenges to the NCIAA
The NCIAA was the subject of a lawsuit before it ever became law.  In
2006, seven plaintiffs comprised of bar, tavern, and grocery store owners filed
suit for an injunction to keep the initiative off the November general election
ballot, claiming that the proposed Act would violate due process, equal protec-
tion, and the right to privacy.69  The First Judicial District Court in Carson
City, Nevada denied the injunction, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.70
The initiative remained on the ballot, and the voters passed it into law in the
2006 general election.71
Other constitutional challenges to the NCIAA soon followed.  Shortly
after the initiative passed, a group of tavern owners filed suit in the Eighth
Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada seeking to restrain enforcement
of the NCIAA and claiming the Act was impermissibly vague as a criminal
statute in violation of due process.72  In Fame Operating Co. v. Chanos,73 oth-
erwise known as the Tavern Owners lawsuit, the petitioners further claimed the
NCIAA violated equal protection under both the United States and Nevada
Constitutions by relying on arbitrary and irrational classifications for enforce-
ment unrelated to any legitimate government interest.74  The district court
agreed, in part, and found that, when read as a criminal statute, the NCIAA was
unconstitutional, its provisions impermissibly vague, and the Act encouraged
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.75  However, when read as a civil
statute, the district court determined that the NCIAA was not impermissibly
vague.76  Therefore, the district court ordered the criminal portion of the
68 Fame Operating Co. v. Chanos, No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 5,
2006), argued, Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, No. 49223 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2009);
Sands v. Bent Barrel, Inc., No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2007).
69 Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224, 1226-28 (Nev. 2006).
70 Id. at 1226.
71 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483 (2007).
72 Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 10, at 3, 10-24.
73 Fame Operating Co. v. Chanos, No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 5,
2006).
74 Tavern Owners’ Complaint, supra note 4, at 3.
75 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part, Denying Summary Judgment in Part, supra
note 5, at 4.
76 Id. at 5.
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NCIAA severed from the text of the Act,77 and both parties appealed.78  The
case is currently pending before the Nevada Supreme Court79 and will be ana-
lyzed in depth in the next section.
Several other lawsuits followed the Tavern Owners suit.  Most notably, in
Sands v. Bent Barrel, Inc.,80 the Southern Nevada Health District (“Health Dis-
trict”) filed a motion for preliminary injunction against Bent Barrel, Inc., (d/b/a,
Bilbo’s Bar & Grill) (“Bilbo’s”).81  The Health District charged Bilbo’s with
violating the NCIAA by allowing bar patrons to smoke and providing ashtrays
and other smoking paraphernalia to customers.82  Bilbo’s responded that their
ashtrays and matchbooks were advertising materials and therefore protected as
commercial free speech.83  Additionally, in its response, Bilbo’s raised substan-
tially similar constitutional claims to those raised in Tavern Owners.84
Although the greater part of this case is still pending in the Eighth Judicial
District Court, the court entered a preliminary injunction requiring Bilbo’s to
remove its ashtrays and matches from areas where the NCIAA prohibits
smoking.85
B. Other Lawsuits filed by the Southern Nevada Health District
Other suits filed by the Health District were resolved without protracted
litigation.  For example, the Health District filed suit against Eminence Enter-
prise, Inc., (d/b/a as “Irene’s”) to enforce compliance with the NCIAA.86  Simi-
lar to the complaint in the Bilbo’s case, the Health District complained that
Irene’s violated the NCIAA by allowing patrons to smoke, in addition to failing
to remove ashtrays and other smoking paraphernalia, and not posting the
required “No Smoking” signs by its entrance.87  The parties settled the dispute
with a stipulation and order for temporary restraining order in which Irene’s
77 Id. at 6.
78 Notice of Appeal I, supra note 6; Notice of Appeal III, supra note 7; Notice of Appeal II,
supra note 6.
79 Fame Operating Co. v. Chanos, No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 5,
2006), argued, Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC, No. 49223 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2007).
80 Sands v. Bent Barrel, Inc., No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2007).
Note that the original named defendant was “Three B’s,” but was later corrected to reflect
Bent Barrel, Inc. See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Other Relief, Sands, No.
07-A540305 (Nev. 8th. Jud. Dist. Ct. May 7, 2007) [hereinafter Sands’ Amended Compl.].
81 Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Sands v. Three B s, Inc., No. 07-
A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Sands’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction].
82 Id. at 7, 10.
83 Bilbo’s Opposition, supra note 10, at 2.
84 See, e.g., Bilbo’s Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 54, at 3-4.
85 Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Sands, No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct.
June 7, 2007).
86 Complaint for Declaratory & Other Relief, Sands v. Eminence Enterprise, No. 07-
A542639 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. June 8, 2007) [hereinafter Eminence Complaint]; Plain-
tiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Sands, No. 07-A542639 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct.
June 8, 2007) [hereinafter Eminence Motion for Preliminary Injunction].
87 Eminence Complaint, supra note 86, at 3; Eminence Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
supra note 86, at 8.
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promised to adhere to the NCIAA.88  Additionally, the owner of Irene’s com-
pleted construction of a wall separating its bar from the restaurant.89  Once the
wall was completed, Irene’s became exempt from the Act’s provisions as a
“stand-alone bar.”90
IV. ANALYSIS
Depending on one’s point of view, the NCIAA either goes too far, or does
not go far enough.  On the one hand, the NCIAA goes too far by enforcing the
ban in bars and taverns where individuals under twenty-one years of age are not
permitted.91  The restriction on smoking in health care facilities, schools, and
childcare centers,92 by contrast, should remain in place because this provision
reasonably accomplishes the state’s goal of protecting children and families
from secondhand smoke.  However, establishments catering to adult patrons
should be exempt, and the law should allow people to choose whether to fre-
quent a smoke-free bar, casino, restaurant, or other establishment that permits
smoking.
Alternatively, the NCIAA does not go far enough because it exempts
many public buildings from compliance.93  The stated purpose of the Act indi-
cates a goal of improving air quality in public places frequented by children
and families.94  However, nowhere in the statute or in the arguments for or
against the Act are appropriate air quality levels mentioned.  Furthermore, if the
Act protects children and families by banning smoking in bars that serve food
and in casinos with fifteen or fewer slot machines, then it would further accom-
plish this purpose by banning smoking in all bars and casinos.  The presence of
sixteen or more slot machines does not magically transform a casino permitting
smoking into a less hazardous environment.  Banning smoking in all bars and
casinos would bring the NCIAA much closer to its goal of protecting all people
from the effects of secondhand smoke.
The following analysis will demonstrate that the NCIAA goes too far in
attempting to impose a smoking ban on casinos and stand-alone bars.  This
Section will take an in-depth look at two lawsuits currently challenging the
NCIAA’s constitutionality, Tavern Owners and Bilbo’s, with an analysis of the
claims that the Act violates constitutional due process and equal protection.
Following the analysis, this section explains how the NCIAA is enforced and
ways in which businesses are working around the Act, followed by ideas for
alternative ways to encourage smoke-free businesses without imposing a smok-
ing ban.
88 Stipulation & Order for Temporary Restraining Order at 2-4, Sands, No. 07-A542639
(Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Aug. 23, 2007).
89 Id. at 2, 4.
90 Id. at 2.
91 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(1), (3)(b) (2007).
92 Id. § 202.2483(1)-(2), (3)(e).
93 Id. § 202.2483(3).
94 See ASSEM. 2005-I.P. 1, 73d Sess., § 1 (Nev. 2005). See also supra text accompanying
note 2.
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A. Raising the Constitutional Challenge:  A discussion of Tavern Owners
and Bilbo’s.
As briefly discussed in section III, the two principal cases currently chal-
lenging the NCIAA’s constitutionality are the Tavern Owners and Bilbo’s law-
suits.95  Both cases raise similar constitutional issues regarding due process and
equal protection.  Clean indoor air acts in other states have survived similar
constitutional challenges, including claims that the smoking bans violate a
smoker’s right to privacy or amounts to a regulatory taking.96  However, these
two Nevada cases challenge the NCIAA on somewhat different grounds.  First,
business owners in both Tavern Owners and Bilbo’s claim the Act violates due
process because its language is too vague to give notice of what action the
statute prohibits.97  Second, the owners in both cases allege the NCIAA vio-
lates equal protection because it treats similarly situated establishments differ-
ently based upon criteria not rationally related to accomplishing the Act’s goal
of protecting children and families from the harmful effects of secondhand
smoke.98  The vagueness claims are somewhat weak, and likely will not prevail
in the Nevada Supreme Court.  However, the claim that the NCIAA violates
equal protection has merit, and the court should declare the casino exemption
unconstitutional for treating similarly situated businesses differently.
1. The Tavern Owners Case
Three days before the NCIAA went into effect, a group of twenty-five bar
and tavern owners filed an action to restrain enforcement of the Act.99  The
plaintiffs claimed the criminal aspect of the NCIAA violated the due process
clause of the United States and Nevada Constitutions because its provisions
were too vague to “provide notice sufficient to enable ordinary people to under-
stand what conduct is prohibited.”100  Additionally, plaintiffs claimed the
NCIAA is unconstitutional as a civil statute because it violates equal protection
under both the United States and Nevada Constitutions by the Act’s “wholly
arbitrary treatment of similarly situated business.”101  Further, the plaintiffs
claimed the Act violated due process because the “NCIAA confuses [both] bus-
iness owners and individuals and leaves them to speculate as to how to com-
ply[.]”102  The Nevada Tavern Owners Association intervened in the suit,103
and subsequently filed a joinder and supplement in support of the plaintiffs’
95 Fame Operating Co. v. Chanos, No. 06-A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Dec. 5,
2006), argued, Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v. Chanos, No. 49223 (Nev. Apr. 6, 2009);
Sands v. Bent Barrel, Inc., No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 2007).
96 Jessica Niezgoda, Note, Kicking Ash(Trays):  Smoking Bans in Public Workplaces, Bars,
and Restaurants Current Laws, Constitutional Challenges, and Proposed Federal Regula-
tion, 33 J. LEGIS. 99, 110-15 (2006).
97 Bilbo’s Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 54, at 3; Tavern Owners’ Complaint, supra
note 4, at 3.
98 Bilbo’s Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 54, at 4; Tavern Owners’ Complaint, supra
note 4, at 3;.
99 Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra
note 10, at 3.
100 Id. at 24.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 5.
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motion for preliminary injunction.104  This supplement claimed that the
NCIAA affects a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution by seek-
ing to control the air space of private property for a public purpose.105
The above claims of unconstitutionality arose from the combined claims
of several different plaintiffs and the Nevada Tavern Owners’ Association,
which represents more than 200 taverns throughout Nevada.106  The plaintiffs
claimed violation of their equal protection rights.107  For example, owners of
the Three Angry Wives Pub, holders of a restricted gaming license, claimed
their establishment operated in an “identical manner to other taverns which
hold nonrestricted gaming licenses” and where smoking is permitted under the
NCIAA.108  Further, this plaintiff argued there was no rational basis for the
NCIAA to treat taverns with nonrestricted gaming licenses more favorably by
allowing smoking than the Act treated the Three Angry Wives Pub with its
restricted gaming license, given that the two establishments were similar,
except for the number of slot machines.109
Several plaintiffs in the case claimed the Act violated their due process
rights based on its vague definition of “casino.”110  According to plaintiff Vil-
lage Pub, such vagueness meant a casino owner could not determine how to
conduct business in a way that lawfully allowed smoking.111  An example of
the confusion over the Act’s language involved operators of slot routes holding
nonrestricted gaming licenses and who had grocery store locations on their
routes.112  On the one hand, the NCIAA prohibits smoking in all areas of gro-
cery stores, while on the other hand, the NCIAA allows smoking in casinos
holding a nonrestricted gaming license.113  Plaintiff Market Gaming, Inc. had
two nonrestricted locations inside grocery stores on its slot route.  Given the
vague definition under the Nevada Revised Statutes of “casino” as an establish-
ment holding a nonrestricted gaming license, Market Gaming claimed it could
not determine how to conduct its business in a manner that allowed them to
permit smoking within their nonrestricted gaming locations located within gro-
cery stores.114  Market Gaming further claimed it could not discern within the
gaming areas where smoking may be permitted, and could not determine
whether they needed to “change the name of their locations to include the term
103 Motion to Intervene Pursuant to NRCP 24, Fame Operating Co., Inc. v. Chanos, No. 06-
A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Motion to Intervene].
104 Plaintiff Nevada Tavern Owners’ Association’s Joinder & Supplement to the Supple-
mental Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Fame Operating Co., No. 06-
A532434 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 2006).
105 Id. at 3.
106 See Motion to Intervene, supra note 103, at 4.
107 See, e.g., Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 10, at 4.
108 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., id.
111 Id. at 6.
112 Id. at 7.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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‘casino’ in order to permit smoking.”115  A similar slot route operation, E-T-T,
Inc., claimed it could not determine which grocery store locations were exempt
from the smoking ban, because grocery store casinos were subject “arbitrarily
to different regulations under the NCIAA than its nonrestricted gaming
locations.”116
Plaintiff Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC, owners of Terrible’s Hotel and
Casino, also challenged the NCIAA for failing to clarify whether a hotel room
is exempt from the NCIAA or is “considered an indoor place of employment
where smoking is prohibited.”117  Their claim referenced Herbst Gaming v.
Heller,118 a case where petitioners challenged the Act before voters even
passed it into law.119  In Herbst Gaming, the First Judicial District Court in
Carson City, Nevada found that hotel and motel rooms were included in the
smoking ban.120  However, the Nevada Supreme Court subsequently dismissed
the constitutional challenge in Herbst Gaming and rendered the district court’s
interpretation void because the issue was not ripe for review, chastising the
district court for rendering an “improper advisory opinion.”121  The owners of
Terrible’s Hotel and Casino raised the issue again in the Tavern Owners case.
Ultimately, both plaintiff tavern owners and defendant attorney general
filed motions for summary judgment in the Eighth Judicial District Court in Las
Vegas, Nevada, which were argued January 23, 2007.122  The district court
reviewed the NCIAA as both a criminal statute and as a civil statute before
issuing its order granting in part and denying in part both parties’ motions.123
In his order, Judge Douglas Herndon found the NCIAA constitutional as a civil
statute.124  However, he ordered the criminal provisions severed from the
NCIAA, finding them facially unconstitutional, stating, “vagueness permeates
the whole statute, leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”125
Specifically, the court found that the criminal enforcement standards were
impermissibly vague and lacked a scienter clause, ultimately encouraging arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.126  Both parties appealed this ruling, and
the case is currently pending in the Nevada Supreme Court.127
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 6.
118 Herbst Gaming, Inc. v. Heller, 141 P.3d 1224 (Nev. 2006).
119 See id. at 1227.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1232, 1234.
122 See, e.g., Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part, Denying Summary Judgment in
Part, supra note 5, at 3.
123 Id. at 4-6.
124 Id. at 6.
125 Id. at 4.
126 Id.
127 See Notice of Appeal I, supra note 6; Notice of Appeal III, supra note 7; Notice of
Appeal II, supra note 6.  At the time research for this Note closed, oral arguments were
scheduled for April 6, 2009, before the Nevada Supreme Court en banc. See Nevada
Supreme Court Docket Sheet, Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC vs. Chanos, No. 49223
(Nev. filed Mar. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Docket Sheet].
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-3\NVJ307.txt unknown Seq: 14 15-SEP-09 10:18
738 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:725
2. The Bilbo’s Case
In April 2007, the Southern Nevada Health District filed a motion for pre-
liminary injunction against Bent Barrel, d/b/a Bilbo’s Bar and Grill.128  In its
motion, the Health District claimed Bilbo’s violated the NCIAA by allowing its
customers to smoke in an area where Bilbo’s also served food, and by provid-
ing ashtrays and matchbooks to its customers.129  In its defiant opposition to
the Health District’s motion for preliminary injunction, Bilbo’s claimed the
NCIAA was unenforceable because it violated both the United States and
Nevada Constitutions.130  Bilbo’s claimed the Act was unconstitutionally vague
regarding several terms.131  First, defendant Bilbo’s asserted that the phrase
“smoking tobacco in any form” was vague because it did not state that the “act
of smoking” was prohibited and the Act failed to define the term “smoking
paraphernalia.”132  Next, Bilbo’s argued the novel claim that forcing it to
remove its ashtrays and matchbooks would violate Bilbo’s First Amendment
right to commercial free speech, because the tavern provided these items to
customers as advertising for its business.133  Bilbo’s answer also piggy-backed
onto allegations contained in the Tavern Owners suit by claiming the NCIAA is
unconstitutional as a criminal statute and violates the equal protection clause in
both the United States and Nevada Constitutions.134  Bilbo’s further alleged the
Act applied an unconstitutional classification between businesses based upon
the type of gaming license a business holds.135  Finally, Bilbo’s asserted that a
flawed electoral process led to the enactment of the NCIAA.136
The district court granted the preliminary injunction against Bilbo’s and
ordered it to remove the ashtrays and other smoking paraphernalia from its
tavern.137  The court stated that ordering Bilbo’s to remove these items did not
violate its constitutionally protected rights, because Bilbo’s had “numerous
other means of engaging in protected commercial speech.”138  The court further
found the term “other smoking paraphernalia” was not unconstitutionally vague
and the term provided Bilbo’s with fair notice that providing matches at the bar
violates the NCIAA.139  This case is currently pending before the Eighth Judi-
cial District Court with the Health District seeking declaratory and injunctive
128 Sands’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 81. See also supra note 80.
129 Id.  The NCIAA currently allows smoking in stand-alone bars, but prohibits smoking in
taverns with more than “incidental” food service. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(3)(b),
(9)(m) (2007).  The NCIAA further requires nonexempt establishments to remove all ash-
trays and “smoking paraphernalia.” See id. § 202.2483(6).
130 Bilbo’s Opposition, supra note 10, at 1.
131 Id. at 2.
132 Id. at 2, 4.
133 Id. at 2.
134 Id. at 4-7.
135 Id. at 6-7.
136 Id. at 9-11.
137 See Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, supra note 85.
138 Id. ¶ 11.
139 Id. ¶ 8.
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relief and civil penalties against Bilbo’s.140  Bilbo’s has filed a counterclaim for
declaratory and injunctive relief,141 and trial is set for March 1, 2010.142
B. Parts of the NCIAA as a Civil Statute are Unconstitutional
As the following analysis will show, the Act contains vague terms.  How-
ever, this vagueness is not extensive enough to render the NCIAA unconstitu-
tional as a civil statute.  On the other hand, it is much more likely that the
Nevada Supreme Court will find a constitutional violation of equal protection
based upon the Act’s exemptions for certain casinos and stand-alone bars.
1. Due Process Challenges to the NCIAA for Vagueness
Most of the public places where the NCIAA bans smoking reasonably
relate to accomplishing the stated purpose of the statute of protecting children
and families from the harmful effects of secondhand smoke.  The NCIAA pro-
hibits smoking in childcare facilities, movie theaters, video arcades, retail and
grocery stores, schools, government buildings, and indoor areas in restau-
rants.143  These are places commonly frequented by children and families.
However, the exemptions for stand-alone bars and casinos do not reasonably
relate to accomplishing the Act’s purpose.  Furthermore, opponents to the
NCIAA claim the NCIAA’s vague terms leave them wondering how to comply
with the Act, as discussed in section IV of this Note.144
Business owners in both the Tavern Owners and Bilbo’s lawsuits claim
terms contained within the NCIAA are so vague that the Act leaves individuals
and business owners confused and required to speculate about how to comply
with its provisions.  Specifically at issue are the terms “stand-alone bars,” “tav-
erns,” and “saloons.”145  The Health District responded that, given the liberal
construction provided to legislation designed to protect public health, a chal-
lenge to these terms will probably fail to persuade the Nevada Supreme Court
that the NCIAA is unconstitutionally vague.146
Judge Herndon struck down the criminal component of the NCIAA as
impermissibly vague in the Tavern Owners suit, and issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the Act as a criminal statute; however, the
judge did not enjoin enforcement of the Act as a civil statute.147  The judge
determined the Act lacked explicit standards for those individuals applying the
140 See Joint Case Conference Report, Sands v. Bent Barrel, Inc., No. 07-A540305 (Nev.
8th Jud. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2007).
141 Id. at 1. See also Bilbo’s Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 54, at 6-9.
142 Order Setting Civil Non-Jury Trial, Sands, No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct.
Nov. 6, 2008).
143 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483 (1)-(2) (2007).
144 See supra notes 97, 100, 102, 110-17, 131-32 and accompanying text.
145 See, e.g., Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 10, at 5.
146 See Plaintiff’s Reply Point & Authorities in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion at 2-7, Sands, No. 07-A540305 (Nev. 8th Jud. Dist. Ct. May 14, 2007) [hereinafter
Sands’ Reply].
147 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part, Denying Summary Judgment in Part, supra
note 5, at 4-6.
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law, an omission that could lead to arbitrary enforcement.148  Furthermore,
Judge Herndon found the NCIAA lacked sufficient notice to the population
regarding what activity is criminal and who will enforce the Act.149
The Nevada Supreme Court has discussed statutes containing unconstitu-
tional vagueness in violation of due process as follows:  “It is well established
that a statute or ordinance which is so vague that men of common intelligence
must guess at its meaning violates the due process guarantees found both in the
Nevada and United States Constitutions because no fair notice or warning of
the prohibited action is given.”150  When applying rules of statutory construc-
tion, a statute is read to avoid raising constitutional questions if such a con-
struction is fairly possible.151  The question now is whether the NCIAA, when
read in its entirety as a civil statute, gives reasonable notice of what behavior is
prohibited, by whom, and where.
The owners in Bilbo’s argue that “other smoking paraphernalia” is not
further defined in the Act, which leaves “men of common intelligence to guess
at its meaning.”152  While it is true the authors of the NCIAA could have stated
more clearly what activity the Act prohibits, it is reasonable to assume that men
and women of common intelligence recognize “smoking paraphernalia” as
those items associated with smoking cigarettes.  Ashtrays and matches obvi-
ously fall into this category because these items facilitate the act of smoking.
The NCIAA also states, in pertinent part, “smoking tobacco in any form is
prohibited,” rather than prohibiting the “act of smoking.”153  It seems unlikely
that anyone truly is confused about what this statement means.  Whether a ciga-
rette, a cigar, or a pipe, the NCIAA clearly prohibits smoking it in nonexempt
establishments.  Chewing tobacco, for example, is not included within the Act’s
proscription.  This is in line with the purpose of the Act, which is to protect
people from secondhand smoke, which is not an issue when a person chews
tobacco.  With the heavy presumption of constitutionality afforded to social
legislation,154 it is doubtful that an argument that “smoking tobacco” or “smok-
ing paraphernalia” are vague terms will be sufficient to convince the Nevada
Supreme Court to render the Act as unconstitutionally vague.
2. The NCIAA Violates Equal Protection
As stated above, most of the public places where the NCIAA bans smok-
ing reasonably relate to accomplishing the statute’s purpose.  Childcare facili-
ties, movie theaters, video arcades, retail and grocery stores, schools, and
148 Id. at 4.
149 Id.
150 Edwards v. City of Reno, 742 P.2d 486, 488 (Nev. 1987) (citations omitted), cited in
Bilbo’s Opposition, supra note 10, at 3-4.
151 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 332 (1988), cited in Sands’ Reply, supra note 146, at 4.
See also State v. Glusman, 651 P.2d 639, 644 (Nev. 1982) (noting that the Nevada Supreme
Court has long recognized, as a general principle, “that statutes should be construed, if rea-
sonably possible, so as to be in harmony with the [C]onstitution”).
152 See Sands’ Reply, supra note 146, at 3.
153 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(1) (2007).
154 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(noting that states are given wide latitude under the Equal Protection Clause when social or
economic legislation is at issue).
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government buildings are places where one commonly finds children and fami-
lies.  However, the Act’s exemption for stand-alone bars and casinos is prob-
lematic, particularly the casino exemption, which relies on the description of a
casino found in Nevada Revised Statutes, section 463.0177.155  As set forth
earlier in this Note, a casino, for purposes of the NCIAA, is an establishment
with a nonrestricted gaming license given to businesses operating sixteen or
more gaming machines.156  Therefore, a restricted gaming license allows up to
fifteen slot machines,157 which does not entitle such an establishment to the
NCIAA exemption.158  Furthermore, the NCIAA bases the description of a
stand-alone bar on whether food service is “incidental” to the bar’s business.159
These distinctions between similarly situated establishments cause the provi-
sions of the NCIAA to be unequally applied based upon criteria unrelated to the
purpose of the Act.  The result is an unconstitutional violation of equal
protection.
If the classification scheme set forth in a statute is arbitrary and irrational
and is too broad in its sweep, the statute violates the equal protection guaran-
tees contained in both the United States and Nevada Constitutions.160  The
defendants in Bilbo’s argue that exempting casinos, as defined in the Nevada
gaming statutes, creates an arbitrary classification between smoking and non-
smoking taverns based on the number of slot machines.161  Arguably, this clas-
sification does not meet equal protection standards.  However, as expressed by
the United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans,162 a classification is con-
stitutional if it “bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”163  Further-
more, in Romer, the Court found the purpose of a statute may not be to
discriminate against a politically unpopular group.164  For a classification to be
constitutional, it must be “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest.”165  Therefore, in order to show an equal protection violation, oppo-
nents to the NCIAA must demonstrate that the exempt establishment is sub-
stantially similar to the business operation of a nonexempt establishment.166
The equal protection argument presented in both the Tavern Owners and
Bilbo’s lawsuits is more persuasive than the vagueness due process argument.
The casino exemption is applied unequally because it is based upon criteria
which discriminate between substantially similar businesses, rather than criteria
which promote the Act’s purpose of improving the air quality in public build-
ings to protect children and families from secondhand smoke.  Perhaps provid-
155 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(9)(a).
156 See id.; NEV. REV. STAT. 463.0177(1) (2007).
157 NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.0189 (2007) (providing the definition for a “restricted license”).
158 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(9)(a) (requiring a “casino” to have a nonrestricted, as
opposed to restricted, gaming license for the purposes of the NCIAA).
159 See id. § 202.2483(9)(m).
160 Barnes v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 748 P.2d 483, 487 (Nev. 1987) (citing Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 (1972)), cited in Bilbo’s Opposition, supra note 10, at 4-5.
161 Bilbo’s Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 54, at 4.
162 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
163 Id. at 631.
164 Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
165 Barnes, 748 P.2d at 486.
166 See Sands’ Reply, supra note 146, at 9.
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ing a casino exemption was simply a ruse to encourage voters to pass the
NCIAA.  Most voters probably did not realize how the Act defined “casino,”
and reasonably assumed that smaller taverns with fifteen or fewer gaming
machines were also exempt from the purview of the Act.  People want the
freedom to choose whether to smoke when they are out for a drink or playing
video poker at their neighborhood casino.  Moreover, a smoking ban is unnec-
essary.  If a tavern or casino owner believes there is a market for a smoke-free
establishment, he or she has always been free to run his or her business accord-
ingly.  Customers will either frequent or avoid the business if they are unhappy
with the atmosphere.  Furthermore, if the true purpose of the NCIAA is to
improve indoor air quality, the Act would impose measurable air quality stan-
dards rather than discriminate between businesses based upon the number of
slot machines.
The NCIAA’s casino exemption includes all of the large casino-resorts
across the state, while the smaller, neighborhood establishments are subject to
the Act’s smoking ban.  This exemption indicates that those in favor of the
NCIAA recognized that a ban on smoking in large casino-resorts would incon-
venience visitors and tourists and possibly have a negative impact on the state’s
economy.  The casino exemption acknowledges that when people gamble, they
often like to smoke.  If smoking in the major casinos were restricted, smokers
may just decide to take their vacation somewhere that allows smoking.
Allowing people to smoke in big casinos is an example of how the NCIAA
does not go far enough to accomplish its purported goal.  If voters were truly
intent on protecting people from the harmful effects of secondhand smoke, the
smoking ban would apply to all casinos, regardless of the type of gaming
license held by the casino.  This illustrates the irrational distinction in the
NCIAA of exempting a casino based on what type of gaming license it holds
and indicates a violation of equal protection.
Obtaining a nonrestricted gaming license is increasingly difficult for small
casinos.  There has been a shift in the Nevada Legislature to issue nonrestricted
gaming licenses only to casino-resorts within gaming enterprise districts as out-
lined under Nevada Revised Statutes, sections 463.3072-463.3094.167  The
rational basis for this shift cited by the Health District is to promote tourism
and gaming in casinos where gaming is the primary business, pursuant to pub-
lic policy expressed under Nevada Revised Statutes, chapter 463.168  It is inter-
esting to note that neither the statutes limiting new nonrestricted gaming
licenses to casinos in the gaming zones, nor the NCIAA, cite better air circula-
tion systems in bigger casinos as the reason for exempting establishments with
sixteen or more slot machines.169  This indicates that the exemption for casinos
found in the NCIAA is used to inhibit business at smaller casinos, while
encouraging the growth of casinos in gaming zones, rather than the Act’s stated
purpose of protecting children and families from secondhand smoke.  Between
167 Id. at 16.  These statutes limit the growth of gaming in Clark County to gaming zones
identified by the statutes.  Nevada Revised Statutes, section 463.308 limits approval of a
nonrestricted gaming license to new establishments or those wishing to expand which are
located in a “gaming enterprise district” only. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.308(3) (2007).
168 Sands’ Reply, supra note 146, at 16.
169 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 202.2483, 463.3072 to.3094 (2007).
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the NCIAA’s smoking ban and the hurdles facing a proprietor who wishes to
obtain a nonrestricted gaming license, making a profit with a small casino will
be more difficult.
C. Enforcing the NCIAA
The NCIAA states that its provisions are severable.170  Therefore, the
Health District continues to enforce the civil provisions remaining in effect
after Judge Herndon enjoined enforcement of the criminal portion of the
Act.171  When taken together, the NCIAA, the lawsuits, and the affidavits of
Mark Gillespie regarding his investigations for the Southern Nevada Health
District, describe enforcement of the NCIAA as a civil statute.  The Act
requires health authorities to enforce the provisions and issue citations for vio-
lations.172  The Act also requires business owners of nonexempt establishments
to post “No Smoking” signs at their entrances and remove all ashtrays and
other smoking paraphernalia.173  To help restaurant and bar owners understand
the requirements imposed by the NCIAA, the Southern Nevada Health District
published A Guide for Restaurants and Bars available on their website,
explaining the rules of the Act.174  The Health District’s guide also explains
how business owners and managers should help enforce the Act.175  The Health
District suggests that owners, managers, or employees of nonexempt establish-
ments enforce the Act by reminding patrons who are smoking that they are in
violation of the law.176  If a patron refuses to stop smoking, the Health District
suggests the manager inform the patron that he could be subject to civil penal-
ties for violating the Act.177  If the patron continues to smoke, the manager or
employee should ask him to leave.178
The citation process begins with an inspection of a nonexempt business by
a Health District employee.179  For example, in the case of Sands v. Eminence
Enterprise,180 a Health District investigator visited Irene’s, a nonexempt estab-
lishment under the NCIAA, and observed patrons smoking, ashtrays at the bar
and on the tables, and a cigarette machine.181  The investigator identified him-
170 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(11).
171 Order Granting Summary Judgment in Part, Denying Summary Judgment in Part, supra
note 5, at 5-6.  The appeal regarding this decision is currently pending before the Nevada
Supreme Court. See Notice of Appeal I, supra note 6; Notice of Appeal III, supra note 7;
Notice of Appeal II, supra note 6.
172 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(7).
173 Id. § 202.2483(6).
174 S. NEV. HEALTH DIST., NEVADA CLEAN INDOOR AIR ACT:  A GUIDE FOR RESTAURANTS






179 See Southern Nevada Health District, The Nevada Clean Indoor Air Act Current
Enforcement Activities, http://www.southernnevadahealthdistrict.org/nciaatobacco/enforce-
ment.htm (last visited June 19, 2009).
180 Sands v. Eminence Enter., No. 07-A542639 (Nev. 8th  Jud. Dist. Ct. filed June 8, 2007).
181 Affidavit of Mark Gillespie, June 8, 2007 ¶ 2, Sands, No. 07-A542639 (Nev. 8th Jud.
Dist. Ct. June 8, 2007) [hereinafter Gillespie Affidavit].
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self to the manager as a Health District investigator and informed the manager
of the observed violations.182  Next, the investigator reported his findings in an
affidavit to the Health District, which, in turn sent a warning letter to Irene’s
owner that he was in “willful disobedience” of the NCIAA.183  Some weeks
after a business receives the warning letter, the investigator conducts a follow-
up visit to determine if the business has since complied with the Act.184  If the
owner has not complied, the Health District may file a civil suit seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief to enforce the NCIAA, plus subject the owner to a
$100 fine for each infraction.185  Many times the Health District and the diso-
bedient owner can resolve the issue informally by stipulating to a temporary
restraining order.186
In Sands v. Eminence Enterprise, the Health District filed a complaint for
declaratory relief against the owners of Irene’s tavern for violations of the
NCIAA.187  In a stipulation and order to settle the matter, the owner agreed to
stop delivering food from the restaurant to its bar area and the Health District
approved a new wall separating the restaurant from the bar.188  However, the
order specifically allowed patrons to bring their own food into the bar, either
from Irene’s grill, or by ordering over the phone from a food delivery ser-
vice.189  The stipulation also allowed Irene’s to complete an “internal door/
window arrangement” to facilitate customers ordering or picking up food pre-
pared by Irene’s grill.190  However, all the window does is effectively inconve-
nience the customer when ordering food from Irene’s grill.  The net effect is
that people are still smoking in what is still a bar and grill.  The only difference
is that people on the restaurant side of Irene’s are free from smoke wafting over
from the bar—except, of course, when the pass-through window is opened to
deliver food.
D. Circumventing the NCIAA
Irene’s is one example of how some bar and grill establishments and their
patrons have found creative ways to work within the constraints of the Act and
still allow smoking.  In order to comply with the NCIAA, many taverns with a
restaurant attached to the bar have simply constructed walls to separate the two
sides.  This allows the bar to qualify as a stand-alone bar, while allowing the
restaurant to continue serving food.191  A recent Op-Ed piece in the Las Vegas
182 Id.
183 Letter from Stephen R. Minagil, Esq., S. Nev. Health Dist., to Eminence Enter. (May 2,
2007) (attached to Eminence Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 86).
184 See, e.g., Gillespie Affidavit, supra note 181, ¶ 3 (stating Gillespie again surveyed the
establishment to determine compliance following an initial survey the month before).
185 See, e.g., Sands’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 81, at 8-9; Eminence
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 86, at 11.
186 See Stipulation & Order for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88.
187 See Eminence Complaint, supra note 86.
188 Stipulation & Order for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at 2.
189 Id. at 3.
190 Id. at 4.
191 The NCIAA defines a stand-alone bar as “an establishment devoted primarily to the sale
of alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the premises, in which food service is incidental to
its operation, and provided that smoke from such establishments does not infiltrate into areas
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Review-Journal described how other, nonexempt establishments work around
the Act.192  As the author points out, under the NCIAA, a bar waiter may not
place food orders with a bar’s adjoining restaurant.193  However, bar waiters
continue to bus the tables in the bar where customers consumed the food.  As
the opinion editorial piece points out, “Supporters of Question 5[194] argued
their proposal was needed to protect children from secondhand smoke.  To
make up for the fact that kids can’t sit at bars, they’re now treating adults who
wish to smoke while dining out as though they’re children.”195  The stipulation
between the Health District and Irene’s demonstrates some of the problems
created for business owners and the lengths they go to in order to comply with
the NCIAA and still offer food service to their customers.
As another article in the Las Vegas Review-Journal points out, “you can
enjoy a burger and onion rings while playing video poker and downing a cold
brew at bars where smoking is allowed.  You’re just the one who has to take
care of getting the food in front of you.”196  For example, PT’s Pub went to
great lengths to accommodate its customers while staying in compliance with
the NCIAA.197  The owners created PT’s to Go in an attempt to stay within the
law while still providing food to its patrons.198  Hungry customers could order
and pick up food from the PT’s to Go next door and bring it back into PT’s
Pub.199  According to the Health District, businesses that separate their kitchens
from their bars or create a separate corporation for those kitchens and then
serve food to customers inside the newly created stand-alone bar are not fol-
lowing the law.200  “Food service is prohibited in stand-alone bars,” stated Ste-
phen Minagil, attorney for the Health District.201
Like any good government agency, the Health District is attempting to
close these loopholes by developing regulations and creating uniform guide-
lines to enforce the smoking ban.202  As noted earlier, the Health District posts
A Guide for Restaurants and Bars on its website in an attempt to answer
NCIAA compliance questions.203  When a law is “difficult to enforce, you have
to have regulations,” said Joe Hardy, a Health District board member and Las
Vegas physician.204  Perhaps the law is difficult to enforce because it is simply
bad law.
where smoking is prohibited under the provisions of this section.” NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 202.2483(9)(m) (2007).
192 Op-Ed., If the Law Supposes that, the Law is a Ass, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 31, 2007,
at 10B.
193 Id.
194 Question No. 5 was the voter initiative placing the NCIAA on the ballot. See ASSEM.
2005-I.P. 1, 73d Sess. (Nev. 2005).
195 Op-Ed., supra note 192.
196 Annette Wells, You’ll Still Have to BYO Food to the Local Tavern, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,






202 See Stipulation & Order for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 88, at 2.
203 GUIDE, supra note 174.
204 Wells, supra note 196.
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E. There Are Better Ways to Encourage Businesses to Go Smoke-Free.
The government should consider less invasive incentives for bar and
casino owners to go smoke-free, without infringing on smokers’ rights or
impinging a business owner’s freedom to run an establishment as the owner
chooses.  In an exhibit to its motion to intervene in Tavern Owners, the Nevada
Tavern Owners’ Association offered some interesting options on how to do
it.205  The Nevada Legislature would be wise to consider the Tavern Owners’
suggestions, because they would narrow the focus of the NCIAA, while contin-
uing to uphold the intent of the Act.  For example, an amendment to the
NCIAA could allow smoking “in enclosed rooms with separate ventilation sys-
tems,” which would allow those “unwilling to enter an environment containing
smoke an option” to avoid it.206  In fact, creating a standard of compliance for
ventilation systems makes more sense than a ban on smoking.  This would
create a standard for air quality without requiring a tavern to go smoke-free.
The difference between walking through a large, modern casino with top-of-the
line ventilation and that of an older casino with poor ventilation demonstrates
how well this could work.  The smell of tobacco smoke is virtually undetect-
able in establishments using adequate ventilation, and the risk associated with
secondhand smoke would be lower in establishments using effective ventila-
tion—whether or not the establishment holds a restricted or nonrestricted gam-
ing license.
Additionally, the state could offer tax advantages that encourage establish-
ments to create smoke-free environments voluntarily.  As argued by the Tavern
Owners’ Association, offering a tax break to smoke-free establishments may
increase the number of smoke-free bars and taverns without imposing eco-
nomic loss in complying with a total smoking ban.207  These solutions also
return to business owners the freedom to choose how to run their establish-
ments.  Nevada and other state clean indoor air acts acknowledge this possibil-
ity in provisions stating that nothing contained in the Act shall prohibit a
business owner from “voluntarily creating nonsmoking sections or designating
the entire establishment as smoke free.”208
Others believe that smoking is a matter of individual choice and that the
free market should determine whether a business goes smoke-free, not the gov-
ernment.209  This approach has merit because, as noted above, business owners
have always had the power and freedom to go smoke-free if they wished.  A
statement made during the debate over Virginia’s smoking ban in restaurants
makes this point of view clear.  In a discussion of the state’s proposed smoking
ban, Delegate David Albo asked, “‘Why do you need a law to protect people
205 See Motion to Intervene, supra note 103, Exhibit “1” ([Proposed] Joinder & Supplement
to Application for Temporary Restraining Order & Motion for Preliminary Injunction) at 5.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.2483(4) (2007). See also CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(h) (West
2007) (“Nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from prohibiting smoking in an
enclosed place of employment for any reason.”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-r(1)
(McKinney 2008) (“Nothing in this article shall be construed to deny the owner . . . the right
to designate the entire place, or any part thereof, as a nonsmoking area.”).
209 Jacobson & Zapawa, supra note 12, at 212.
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when people can protect themselves by not going in’ restaurants that allow
smoking[?]”210  Mr. Albo’s suggestion is the right approach because it affords
both business owners and individuals maximum freedom.  First, individuals
decide whether to frequent only smoke-free establishments.  Second, business
owners decide whether the market determines they go smoke-free or continue
to allow folks to light up.
Allowing the government to dictate matters of personal choice invites
unwelcome invasion into our private lives.  This is the beginning of a slippery
slope, and we already see inklings of government intrusion into other areas of
our personal lives.  For example, consider New York City’s recently passed
ordinance banning all trans fats in any of the city’s restaurants because it has
been linked to blocked arteries and heart disease.211  Another recent example is
the attempt to ban obese people from eating in certain restaurants in the state of
Mississippi.  In Mississippi, three representatives introduced a bill during the
2008 regular legislative session to prohibit restaurants from “serving food to
any person who is obese.”212  It is hard to imagine what could be more inva-
sive.  One can only imagine what comes next when the government begins to
regulate our most personal decisions.
Although society cannot deny the negative health effects of secondhand
smoke, smoking continues to be a legal activity.  As demonstrated above, there
are better ways to encourage business owners to run smoke-free establishments,
while still allowing them the freedom to run their businesses as they choose.
Furthermore, when we allow the government to determine who may smoke and
where, we open the door to other invasive control of our personal health
decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
When a state exercises its police power to regulate a legal activity, such as
smoking tobacco, by imposing both criminal and civil fines and penalties, it
must give careful consideration to balancing the state’s legitimate interest in
protecting the public health of its citizens against the means used to accomplish
that goal.  Legislation containing vague terms or unequal application of the law
fails this balancing test and must be repealed or revised.  The equal protection
claims raised by opponents of the NCIAA have merit, and substantial changes
are necessary to the NCIAA in order to retain constitutional protection for those
impacted by the Act.
Although I believe the free market should determine whether an establish-
ment goes smoke-free or not, the Nevada Clean Indoor Air Act is probably here
to stay.  The terms of the Act are not so vague as to render the NCIAA uncon-
stitutional as a civil statute.  However, if we are going to enforce criminal sanc-
210 Mike Gruss, Proposed Ban on Smoking in Public Places Fails, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Nor-
folk, Va.), Feb. 24, 2006, available at http://hamptonroads.com/node/69811.
211 Thomas J. Lueck & Kim Severson, New York Bans Most Trans Fats in Restaurants,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1.
212 H.B. 282, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008).  This bill died in committee on Feb. 19,
2008.  Miss. Legislature, HB 282 – History of Actions/Background, http://billstatus.ls.state.
ms.us/2008/pdf/history/HB/HB0282.xml (last visited June 19, 2009).
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tions on violators, the Act must clearly set out what the prohibited activity is
and who will be held responsible for infractions.  Reasonable men and women
understand what “smoking tobacco” means, and the statute adequately defines
the term “stand-alone bars.”  However, using the number of gaming machines
in defining a casino for the purposes of the Act and determining whether a
tavern falls within the smoking ban’s exemption is unconstitutional because it
violates the equal protection clause of both the Nevada and the United States
Constitutions.  For these reasons, the Nevada Supreme Court should uphold the
NCIAA against the pending due process challenge for vagueness, but find in
favor of the constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds for the Act’s
unfair distinction between substantially similar business establishments based
on what type of gaming license it holds.213
213 At the time of publication, the appeal of the Tavern Owners case was pending  before
the Nevada Supreme Court following oral arguments held on April 6, 2009. See Docket
Sheet, supra note 127.
